Introduction
The "global turn", the move to writing "Global history", represents one of the most significant historiographical developments of recent decades. Scarcely perceptible in the 1990s, this new approach to questions of scale and narrative has become increasingly popular since the beginning of the new century. It seems set to entrench its scholarly hegemony still further. Historians of the British empire have played a key role in accomplishing the global turn and, in the UK at least, have increasingly come to identify themselves as "Global and Imperial historians". Conferences, research centres and postgraduate programmes promising entry into a sparkling new field of "Global and Imperial history" (presumably more attractive, to funders and students alike, than plain old Imperial history) have proliferated. But what is the exact less than versions of Global history written "from below" that trace the "series of transnational processes in which the histories of diverse places become connected and interdependent".
2 So construed, connected histories of empire might offer accounts that accord more agency to individuals, and recognise the crucial importance of choice, contingency and chance. 3 By avoiding the Olympian perspective that characterises some Global history writing, connected histories of empire can help us develop our understanding of how people in the past themselves understood (and sought to influence) patterns of long-distance interaction, and of how contemporaries themselves drew comparisons between widely-separated parts of the world.
Furthermore, we argue that to derive real value from connected histories of empire, to avoid simply searching for patterns of interconnection for their own sake or as fragmentary evidence for earlier phases of globalization, Imperial historians should devote more attention to links within and between different empires (European and non-European), and within and between different colonies. This offers two associated benefits. First, it can help us correct the Anglophone bias that continues to mark much supposedly "Global" history-often, in fact, a dialogue among English-speaking historians, built on English-language primary and secondary sources and centrally concerned with English-speaking parts of the world. Second, it can assist us in overcoming the long-standing but often misleading tendency to examine the British empire as a singular, hermetically-sealed world-system. Imperial historians need to learn from the willingness of Global historians to dispense with nations and empires as self-evident and self-contained units of analysis. But we need to avoid the planetary simplifications of some brands of Global history, and indeed we need to push the agenda of scalar revisionism further by acknowledging the varied experiences of particular regions within different empires and within different colonies. Our arguments thus diverge significantly from those of another pair of Imperial historians, who have recently offered an overview of what they call "imperial globalization". Global history is a new and diverse field, and one that borrows from and blurs into a number of different approaches. Hunt tends to equate Global history with the history of globalization, and sometimes implies that Global history can really only be written for the period since c.1990, when the entire world seemed to have become interdependent for the first time. 5 However, this is a definition that few Global historians would accept. Attempts to trace the roots of contemporary globalization back into earlier period, as far back as the early modern era or even into the middle ages, are central to what many understand as constituting Global history. Neither, contrary to what Hunt writes, do all Global histories focus directly on globalization or present it as a progressive and inexorable process. On one hand, a conscious or unconscious overlap exists between the work of Global historians and of those who see themselves as practicing "World history". The latter approach emerged largely out of history teaching in US universities, and often involves attempts to write "the whole history of the whole world", offering stories about the entire planet that encompass very long periods of time. 6 Globalization is often only a minor theme in this variant of Global history. On the other hand, a very different branch of Global history owes more to the approaches pioneered by "Transnational history". Transnational historians focus on the "interaction and circulation of ideas, peoples, institutions or technologies." 7 They analyse the "connectors" that provided concrete links between different places and peoples, "the actual ways and means that characterise the encounter of their historical trajectories". 8 Transnational historians often seem less prone to, and less interested in, the simplifications associated with "globalization talk". In this essay, we have called the transnational form of Global history "connected history": to us, it seems to offer Imperial historians much more than approaches that focus on the concept of "globalization", or that are inspired by World history.
The term "connected history" derives largely from an essay published by 
Comparative Methods in Global History
Implicitly or explicitly, connected histories involve comparisons. To understand how those comparisons might fruitfully be presented in connected histories of empire, it is first necessary to consider how they have been undertaken by other scholars. Both
Imperial and Global historians deploy comparative methodologies, but the approaches they adopt often bear little resemblance to one another.
First, an obvious difference is that Imperial and Global historians have tended to base their comparisons on quite different timeframes. with their own peripheries were characterised more by mutual growth and were a closer approximation to free market economics. 24 Pomeranz's "reciprocal" and "encompassing" forms of comparative analysis have drawn historians' attention to the globally distinctive forms of European imperialism and its crucial role in Global history. They have also set the tone for much of the comparative Global history that has followed. 25 For instance, Victor
Lieberman has argued that fruitful comparisons can be drawn between the northern and western regions of Europe on the one hand, and mainland southeast Asia on the other. Pomeranz has found "surprising resemblances" in the early modern period:
Lieberman's research has revealed, in an equally evocative turn of phrase, "strange parallels" operating in the period between c.800 and 1830 CE.
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Yet not all agree with Pomeranz's approach to "re-spacing" the globe. In one of the most significant engagements by an Imperial historian with the field of Global history, C.A. Bayly has rejected entirely the method of "reciprocal comparison". For Bayly, the role of Global history is to "blow down the compartments which historians have made between this region and that region, or between this subdiscipline of history and that one." 27 For Bayly, it is unnecessary to ponder how best to divide the world up into meaningfully comparable units: all regions can meaningfully be compared, because all parts of the world were undergoing similar changes during the period between the French Revolution and the First World War. All regions were "modernizing", becoming more like one another, partly as a result of widely-felt economic transformations, but especially due to the spread of common forms of state organization and intervention. Bayly thus argues for what we might label a "great convergence" rather than a "great divergence", driven by the global diffusion of the model of the "patriotic and information-rich state." 28 Northwest European countries pioneered this model, and as a result enjoyed an early imperial sway over global flows of information, wealth and power. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century the gap was already narrowing, with formidable "modern" states emerging in other parts of the world. The overseas spread of Western influence was always accompanied by "leakages and the transfer of power and intellectual skills" to non-Europeans, ultimately ensuring both that Western dominance was temporary and that "modernity"
was everywhere inevitable. 29 The origins of change might have been "multicentric"-they did not all derive from Europe or the West-but ultimately they all pointed in the same direction. Bayly argues that in the long nineteenth century the entire world thus took a common "step-change" forward, towards "contested uniformity." 
Comparative Methods in Imperial History
As already noted, the debate over the "great divergence" has tended to focus the In more recent years, there have been few attempts to make such large-scale comparisons between European empires. Instead, emergent subjects in Imperial history, such as cultural history and histories of medicine and punishment, have brought together material drawn from across different empires in the context of more narrowly-focused studies. 34 In terms of the scale and nature of the comparisons attempted, most of this work bears very little resemblance to the Global histories inspired by Pomeranz, or to Bayly's history of convergence. Instead of big questions regarding the development of global inequalities or homogeneity, 35 comparisons focus upon more bounded and specific themes and processes as they operated within different imperial formations. The difference is not only in the content, but also in the form. As with the earlier works of Gifford and Louis, these are usually multi-authored edited collections, containing discreet essays that often each address a single imperial power and/or colonial state. 36 Comparative analysis, where it is explicitly conducted, is restricted to introductory essays by volume editors. 37 historians to confront the political work that comparative analysis has done in the past, and to uncover and acknowledge how this has continued to shape academic practice in the present. 42 Stoler also highlights the problem of comparative analysis that treats colonies as fixed and natural entities, when they might better be understood by historians as ideational constructs, their boundaries and state structures an intrinsic part of more obvious attempts to promote the interests of the imperial core. 43 Here, others have similarly alerted us to the danger of adopting colonial states as privileged units of analysis, and of thereby implicitly re-inscribing restrictive, anachronistic and ahistorical colonial-cum-national geographical frameworks. 44 Paying attention to the politics of comparisons in history involves developing a sensitivity to how ideas and knowledge moved around the world. As such, it is an approach that may help to bridge the gap between those Global histories that focus on the "great divergence" or the "great convergence", and those that are more interested in circulations and exchanges. 45 It also helps show how comparative and connected histories can be one and the same thing. As Stoler notes, comparative studies should act "as a window onto specific exchanges, interactions, and connections" that took place in the past. 46 Here, curiously enough, Stoler echoes Pomeranz's point that "encompassing" comparisons, when done properly, are indistinguishable from connected history. and Baud as "Zomia", Scott argues that the diverse populations that resided there were "anarchist" communities. He argues that the mountains were beyond state power, and that the societies that formed there were radically egalitarian and purposely organised so that state structures did not form within them. Illiteracy, swidden agriculture and mobility were essential for this resistance to state structures.
The inhabitants of this region were, he argues, "barbarians by design." 49 These clearly controversial arguments have inspired much debate within Global history circles, including a special issue of the Journal of Global History. 50 Meanwhile, Eric Taggliacozzo's studies of illegal trades in imperial Asia have highlighted the utility of a focus on borderlands for understanding the making of empires. He argues that the illicit goods which were traded in these borderlands drew imperial powers into these regions and led them to attempt to establish fixed territorial boundaries. 51 The idea of borderlands might be explored further in Imperial history:
the networks that operated across borderlands connected competing imperial formations, and events in these frontier zones brought empires into contact and conflict, with repercussions felt in imperial centres. 52 As the work of Schendal, Baud While debate about the coherence of the framework provided by Indian Ocean studies continues, the concept has developed our awareness of deep and lasting connections in the world beyond Europe's shores.
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Within Imperial history, students of South Asia have been foremost in engaging with this new approach. Thomas Metcalfe's seminal study of the "imperial connections" that spanned the Indian Ocean-military, policing and labour networks-uncovered the sub-imperial importance of British India and its resources. 56 Even more recently, Clare Anderson has presented the Indian Ocean as "a dynamic and porous space" in which individuals could construct networks of mobility and communication that crossed the borders of colonies and of the Dutch, French, British and Malagasy empires. 57 Similarly, Sugata Bose's study of the Indian Ocean as an "interregional" space of global interaction at the time when European imperial power was in its ascendency, uses both comparative and connected historical methods, and also draws on individual life-stories to illustrate the complexities of this period.
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Although concerned with imperialism, Bose's book is usually considered a contribution to Global history rather than Imperial history. 59 Yet it can tell us much about the meeting of empires in Asia, and about the historiographical possibilities for interaction between Imperial and Global histories.
The Atlantic Ocean has likewise emerged as a site of historical as well as historiographic convergence, encounter and exchange. In some ways the overlaps between Imperial and Global history are greater here than for the Indian Ocean, since the "Atlantic World" was one that was essentially created through imperialism and slavery. 60 Working with the Atlantic Ocean as a scholarly framework has fostered comparative colonial studies of the early modern period as well as connected histories of trade, peoples, ideas and ecologies (although Latin America and the South Atlantic have not been as well incorporated into this geography). 61 It has acted as an umbrella sheltering studies that operate on very different geographical scales: some examining trans-Atlantic flows; some attempting to integrate all the lands surrounding the Atlantic; and some exploring Atlantic interconnection through a single site. As with Indian Ocean studies, questions have been asked about the coherence of the Atlantic World approach. Nevertheless, it remains an influential spatial framework for histories attempting to incorporate multiple imperialisms and uncover global interconnections. 62 An example of "re-spacing" the world that has emerged more clearly out of the concerns of Imperial history is James Belich's idea of an "Anglo-world". His © 2015 Simon J. Potter, Jonathan Saha and the John Hopkins Press
Replenishing the Earth seeks to explain why English-speaking people multiplied in number so dramatically between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how they accumulated so much wealth and global power. This is a contribution to the "great divergence" debate, but also a central element in recent attempts to rethink the history of British overseas settlement and to restore that history to a key place in our understanding of empire. Belich imagines an Anglo-world that incorporated two distinct but related, and very similar, demographic and economic systems. One gender and sexuality-as well as the social, political and economic realities of these norms-they hope the volume will offer "students of globalization an opportunity to appreciate the role of empires in shaping world systems by tracking embodied experiences across historical time and cultural space." 77 In an even more recent collection, they have raised related concerns about the implications of connected history's focus on imperial networks. In Moving Subjects they warn that the emphasis on the mobility of imperial actors relies on an implicit understanding of Global space as merely a surface across which individuals move. This, they argue, makes places defined as "local" appear as static. To counter this they reconceptualise local places as "translocal" spaces: specific arenas of interaction reproduced across the world through the establishment, maintenance and contestation of empires. These spaces might include sites such as ports, prisons, hospitals, and bedrooms, sites in which definitions of and relationships between colonizer and colonized played out. Their approach reminds us that whilst we trace long-range interconnections, we should also be sensitive to how these world-spanning imperial networks were predicated on interactions operating in local sites that were policed and contested. 78 They also makes us alive to the ways that the production of global spaces of connection, by implication, involves the production of fraught local spaces of interaction. Empires establish themselves by tapping into these connections. They grow by fostering and furthering connections. They attempt to consolidate themselves by trying to survey and regulate connections. And they are undermined and destroyed by those networks and systems of connections that remain beyond their purview and control. This "ceaseless watch and ward" of connections is, for Darwin, intrinsic to all empires, not only modern empires, and not only European empires. 86 In making this argument Darwin presents the study of the history of empires as a crucial way of recovering the history of connectedness. We think that this is an important insight for Imperial historians, but with the caveat that we are wary of the under-examined slippage in Darwin's work between his uncovering of the historical geographies of empires and his use the globe as a scale of analysis. As Burton and Ballantyne have urged, whilst studying this global interconnectedness we must also remain attentive to the related production of "translocal" spaces. Thinking about the connections that crossed imperial, colonial and national borders, and that bound different places into zones that did not neatly correspond with these political frontiers, must be a priority if we are to write truly connected histories of empire.
Conclusions
Comparative methods and a focus on connections have been marked features of Imperial history and Global history alike. In writing connected histories of empire, we can borrow some of the new, invigorating geographical frameworks that have been suggested by Global historians. We can also follow the lead provided by Imperial historians and explore how comparisons were made by contemporary historical actors. The use of "encompassing comparison", and the development of a sensitivity to the "politics of comparison" should, as both Stoler and Pomeranz have suggested, be seen as integral to the writing of connected history. Connected histories of empire might also be informed by the rich Imperial historiography that has revealed the webs, networks, systems and flows that linked up different sites of colonization. However, as the articles in this special issue suggest, these networks should not be examined within an analytical frame that is restricted to a single empire. Different empires were connected to one another, materially as well as through the "politics of comparison".
These connections were thus more than imperial. But they were also less than global, in two senses. Firstly, these interconnections seldom spanned the entire globe. As research on borderlands has illustrated, the processes of imperial expansion and the production of denser webs of interconnection in fact operated to marginalise and exclude some parts of the world. 89 Indeed, to describe these connections as global is to miss the simultaneous and linked process by which places previously networked could become disconnected. 90 Secondly, long-distant interconnections were seldom subjectively experienced as global. Individuals linked by these networks did not selfconsciously conceive of themselves as operating globally. Usually, historical actors regarded themselves as working within the frameworks of empires and nations, even as they combined and switched between local, national and imperial (and ethnic, linguistic and religious) identities as needs might dictate at any given moment.
Connected histories of empires should push us beyond traditional imperial boundaries, but not necessarily to a geographical scale encompassing the entire planet.
The essays in this collection demonstrate the value and potential of studies that deploy these comparative methods and move us towards a truly connected history of within Imperial history as a response to the "cultural turn" of the 1980s. Global history provokes us to think again about the "hard political and economic questions that were once central to imperial history." Yet, in tackling these questions, it would be wrong to relegate cultural histories of empire to the side-lines, particularly given their utility in deconstructing the notions of race and gender that underpinned imperial power structures. Rather, connected histories of empire need to combine cultural, social, economic, political and intellectual approaches: "reintegrating these subdivisions rather than… asserting the paramountcy of one over another." 91 In rising to this challenge, we might hope to produce accounts that combine an awareness of large-scale and global transfers, power formations and inequalities, with an understanding of the roles played by human agency, chance and contingency in shaping the imperial past.
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